When war, rebellions, and dangers erupt, most constitutional governments step outside their usual procedures to deal with regime-threatening conflicts. In this article, I argue that Canada and the United States used extraordinarily similar means for coping with war, rebellion, and danger from their colonial times until the 1970s. After that, however, the two countries followed very different paths. In the 1970s, both Canada and the U.S. came to grips with the use of emergency powers that had spun out of control, but they reacted with different solutions. Canada changed its conception of what constitutionalism required because it saw the excesses as structural. The U.S., by contrast, reacted in a more limited fashion, adding statutory patches rather than generating a new constitutional understanding. As a result of these different responses, Canada and the U.S. now have different legal strategies for handling emergencies, with Canada's more fully constitutionalized than those of the U.S.
These diverging approaches to emergency powers encapsulate some of the differences between the two countries, differences that are particularly apparent in national responses to 9/11. Although the U.S. and Canada had been moving on different constitutional trajectories for some time, the current differences with respect to emergency powers are noteworthy, as I will show in this article, because this was an area in which the two countries had followed parallel tracks, at least until the last few decades.
The similarities between the initial U.S. and Canadian approaches to emergency powers had two primary causes:
1. Both faced similar substantive threats through most of their respective histories. In the nineteenth century, local rebellions were put down by expanding national governments; in the twentieth, emergencies were declared primarily as the domestic face of international conflicts from World War I and World War II through the Cold War. 2. The two countries started with English common law history as a shared point of origin and influence. Even though American and Canadian constitutional history from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth century were quite different, emergency powers were generally exercised in similar ways because both were understood and justified as common law rather than constitutional functions.
In the 1970s, in both countries, criticism of the governments' use of emergency powers led to reform efforts. The Constitution Act adopted in 1982 in Canada contrasted with a less ambitious wave of reform statutes that the U.S. adopted in the 1970s to deal with emergency powers. As the two countries pursued different paths to rein in governmental overreaching, the histories of the U.S. and Canada on the question of emergency powers ceased to be in parallel. Since that time, particularly since 9/11, the U.S. and Canada no longer share a common legal response to crises.
''North American emergencies,'' thus, once referred to a relatively common approach to political crises, but it does so no longer. To show how the parallel development and subsequent divergence occurred, I will proceed chronologically, first examining the English common law heritage of the U.S. and Canada and showing how, until the early decades of the twentieth century, this heritage proved stronger than the provisions of written constitutions when it came to shaping emergency powers. Then I will examine the ways in which the U.S. and Canada changed their uses of emergency powers from World War I through the Cold War. Finally, I will look at the exposure of abuses of emergency powers and at the subsequent reforms that caused the U.S. and Canadian strategies to follow separate paths when dealing with emergencies, with the post-9/11 reactions as my primary illustration.
Martial law and common law
Canada and the U.S. share a common English legal heritage regarding the limits of martial law. From the late eighteenth to the late twentieth centuries, debates in North America about emergency powers recalled English struggles over the appropriate use of martial law. By the time of William Blackstone (and, if Blackstone is to be believed, even from the time of Matthew Hale), the king's authority to invoke martial law was regarded as suspect by scholars and its peacetime use was clearly condemned:
For martial law, which is built upon no settled principles, but which is entirely arbitrary in its definitions, is, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, in truth and reality no law, but something indulged, rather than allowed as a law . . . and therefore it ought not to be permitted in a time of peace, when the king's courts are open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land. 1 Martial law was the illegitimate cousin of military law, and even the king's courts did not generally support his ability to declare it. 2 When an emergency threatened, however, kings invoked martial law anyway. This was the law inherited by both Canada and the U.S. Of course, the United States made a political break from Great Britain with the Revolution, but, in this area of law, the break was not a dramatic one. The text of the U.S. Constitution implicitly lodges authority for the use of martial law in the Congress. Congress has the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in times of domestic insurrection or foreign invasion, 3 and to call forth the militia to execute federal laws as well as to ''suppress insurrections and repel invasion.'' 4 The legislative branch is clearly allocated the responsibility of responding to crises. Nonetheless, as I will show, presidents have taken the lead in this regard. Canada, meanwhile, operated under successive British Mutiny Acts until Confederation in 1867. At the time of Confederation, the British North America Act gave the new Dominion of Canada the authority to raise and maintain its own military during peacetime and also provided Canadian military law with a constitutional footing by lodging the power to regulate the military with the Parliament. 5 The newly constituted Dominion Parliament passed its own Militia Act in 1868. 6 As in the U.S., however, Canada's martial law tended to be a matter of executive declaration.
In the United States, despite the constitutional framework for both war and emergency powers that clearly gave Congress the leading role, martial law grew up largely outside those federal constitutional foundations. For There are extreme cases where the laws become inadequate even to their own preservation, and where the universal recourse is a dictator or martial law. . . . On great occasions, every good officer must be ready to risk himself in going beyond the strict lines of the law, where the public preservation requires it.
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As it turned out, throughout the nineteenth century, martial law was repeatedly declared by state governors in cases of local insurrection. 10 The 5 British North America Act 1867, s. 91. This may be an anachronistic understanding of the Constitution of Canada, because the Privy Council, which had the last word on interpretation of the document, did not treat the BNA Act any differently from an ordinary statute until much later. In Canada, too, the predominant use of the military to put down domestic rebellions must also be understood within the framework of federalism, because Dominion legislation gave the responsibility for maintenance of law and order to the provinces. 13 As a result, local mayors, magistrates, or governors were generally the ones to call in the militia after a proclamation of martial law. Before Confederation, during the Patriote Rebellion of 1837-38, the Privy Council ruled on the limits of emergency powers in During Reconstruction, local declarations of martial law were used to suppress resistance by the Ku Klux Klan. See, e.g., Ex parte Moore, 64 N.C. 802, 808-11 (1870) (North Carolina governor's declaration of martial law in two counties was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court).
Controversies surrounding the use of federal troops to put down local rebellions during Reconstruction led to passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, forbidding their use to ''execute the laws ' 12 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 99-100 (1849). 13 Madsen, supra note 6, at 26.
Canada when the governor of Lower Canada put down the rebellion with force:
. . . in our opinion, the Governor . . . has the power of proclaiming, in any district in which large bodies of the inhabitants are in open rebellion, that the Executive Government will proceed to enforce martial law.
14 After Confederation, substantial national military forces were deployed to put down the North-West Rebellion of 1885. It is, of course, an inherently controversial exercise forcibly to retain dominion over a potentially seceding region, especially when the exercise also raises questions about toleration of ethnic pluralism. Constitutional questions about emergency powers did not arise explicitly, however, during the North-West Rebellion. The North-West Mounted Police (later the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) had their first substantial assignment quelling this uprising. The main leader of the rebellion, Louis Riel, was tried and convicted of treason in the regular courts and executed after a duly passed sentence. Riel remains a controversial figure in Canada-a convicted ''traitor'' who nonetheless has schools and public buildings named after him.
The leading examples of the use of federal emergency powers in the nineteenth century United States were, of course, the instances when they were invoked by President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. When Lincoln became president on March 4, 1861, he faced declarations of secession by seven Southern states that had taken advantage of the gap between his election and his oath of office. 15 He quickly decreed a series of emergency orders to contain the crisis. Congress was not meeting at the time, and Lincoln called it into special session. However, he set the date for the Congressional special session in July, four months away, which gave him plenty of time to invoke executive powers without legislative constraint. Lincoln called out the militias of the states and issued a proclamation blockading Southern ports without benefit of a declaration of war by Congress; ordered nineteen vessels to be added to the navy without benefit of Congressional appropriation; enlarged the size of the federal army despite the clear constitutional language that only Congress can raise the military; and suspended the writ of habeas corpus against the clear constitutional specification that only Congress has this power. 16 Moreover, upon such proclamation, the Governor-in-Council was allowed to act however he ''deems necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada.'' 25 The Governor-in-Council was explicitly given the power, under such circumstances, to censor the media; arrest, detain or exclude persons; control ports and transportation; control commerce of all kinds; and appropriate, control, forfeit, and dispose of property.
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In the case of seized property, compensation was to be given, but the law contained no other references to the rights or liberties of persons that might restrict or moderate the exercise of powers under this law. Since at this time the defense of liberty and the property of individuals rested with the provinces and not with the national government, the key constitutional question raised by federal emergency powers was whether the powers seized were properly within the range of federal power. With the judicial approval of the War Measures Act, the Canadian government proceeded to make the most of its wartime powers. More than 80,000 Canadians were classified as ''enemy aliens'' because they had family ties to the countries with which Canada was at war. During the course of the war, nearly 8,600 of these enemy aliens were interned and their property seized. Most were civilians imprisoned for ''acting in a suspicious manner'' or being ''undesirable,'' as only about 2,300 of those interned were actually in the military of enemy states. Internment continued for two years after the war ended. 31 A summary of these developments can be found at www.educ.sfu.ca/cels/past_art28.html. wartime restrictions on the price and distribution of newsprint were still warranted after German surrender, the Privy Council gave the Canadian government broad leeway in determining when the emergency was over:
[V]ery clear evidence that the crisis had wholly passed away would be required to justify the judiciary, even when the question raised was one of ultra vires which it had to decide, in over-ruling the decision of the Government that exceptional measures were still requisite. . . . It is enough to say that there is no clear and unmistakable evidence that the Government was in error in thinking that the necessity was still in existence.
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Through these lingering emergency powers, it quickly became clear in Canada, as indeed it had in the United States, that, as a practical matter, the executive's acquiescence was required before the use of emergency powers would end, even though as a matter of law, the emergency powers rested with the legislature. The economic crisis of the 1930s brought about invocations of emergency government to deal with economic emergency rather than war or insurrection. The Great Depression in the United States and the Dirty Thirties in Canada produced great expansions in the role of government in the economy and changed the balance of power between the state/provincial governments and the center. Emergencies were declared in both countries. President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared a state of emergency in 1933, directly invoking his article II powers under the Constitution rather than relying on congressional delegation of power. He made extensive use of executive orders to change the contours of the executive branch, though he later sought-and received-retrospective approval from the Congress. 37 The government of Prime Minister Richard Bennett in Canada and the Roosevelt administration in the United States created a variety of new federal-level agencies to regulate the economy in more detail and pushed forward much legislation to cope with the deepening economic crisis. Since some of this regulation changed the balance of power both between the individual and the state as well as between the states/provinces and the center, it was challenged in the courts. 41 Roosevelt's papers from the time indicate that he had no doubt that the economic crisis called for emergency powers: ''. . . the full meaning of the word 'emergency' . . . covered the whole economic and therefore the whole social structure of the country. . . . It was an emergency that went to the roots of our agriculture, our commerce and our industry; it was an emergency that had existed for a whole generation in its underlying causes and for three and one-half years in its visible effects. . . . It could be cured only by a complete reorganization and a measured control of the economic structure.'' III PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 17 (1938-50).
tions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.'' 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935) . And Justice Roberts's opinion for the court in Butler maintained the view that national emergencies do not change the basic constitutional framework: ''The Constitution and the entire plan of our government negative any such use of the power to tax and to spend as the act undertakes to authorize. It does not help to declare that local conditions throughout the nation have created a situation of national concern; for this is but to say that whenever there is a widespread similarity of local conditions, Congress may ignore constitutional limitations upon its own powers and usurp those reserved to the states.'' 297 U.S. 1, 74-75. Justice Stone disagreed and would have granted increased legislative rather than executive power to cope with the crisis: ''As the present depressed state of agriculture is nation wide in its extent and effects, there is no basis for saying that the expenditure of public money in aid of farmers is not within the specifically granted power of Congress to levy taxes to 'provide for the . . . general welfare.''' 297 U.S. 1, 79 (Stone, dissenting). 43 In the Products Marking Act reference case, Sir Lyman Duff, writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, seemed deferential at first:
No doubt there may be cases arising out of some extraordinary peril to the national life of Canada, as a whole, such as the cases arising out of a war, where legislation is required of an order that passes beyond the heads of exclusive Provincial competency. Such cases may be dealt with under the words at the commencement of s. 91, conferring general powers in relation to peace, order and good government, simply because such cases are not otherwise provided for. 45 In the United States, the American president proclaimed a ''limited'' national emergency on September 8, 1939, but this was converted in 1941 to an ''unlimited'' national emergency even before the U.S. officially entered the war. 46 The declarations of emergency allowed the president to invoke special statutory provisions that increased his powers upon such a declaration rather than, as in Canada, invoking a general grant of emergency power given under one expansive and unspecific law. As in Canada, however, emergency measures in the U.S. continued beyond the end of the war, and it was not until mid-1947 that Congress formally ended the use of emergency government. In Canada, the most controversial Orders in Council, passed under the authority of the War Measures Act, dealt with enemy aliens. As in World War I, enemy aliens were forced to register and were monitored during the war. In 1940, German and Italian nationals resident in Canada, as well as anyone of German or Italian descent naturalized after 1922, were categorized as enemy aliens. After Pearl Harbor, 22,000 Japanese-Canadians were added to the list and given less than twenty-four hours to pack before being interned. Their property was seized and sold to pay for their internment.
One might have thought that the end of the war would have ended emergency measures. Instead, actions against those of Japanese descent living in Canada intensified, with three Orders in Council passed under the authority of the War Measures Act in December 1945, four months after the bombs were dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing about a Japanese surrender. These three orders: (a) mandated the deportation to Japan of Japanese nationals resident in Canada; (b) ordered deportations of naturalized British subjects of Japanese descent who had made requests for repatriation to Japan before or during the war; and (c) began investigations into the status of naturalized ethnically Japanese citizens of Canada to determine whether they should be deported as well. Family members might be included along with the identified targets in each of these deportation proceedings. In the United States, emergency powers were invoked in plentiful measure during the war. But rather than having a general-purpose emergency statute in the U.S. equivalent to the War Measures Act in Canada, congressional grants of emergency powers to the president were given in piecemeal fashion. President Roosevelt's declaration of a ''limited'' national emergency in 1939 was made in order to take advantage of certain emergency powers he had been given by statute. 50 Before Pearl Harbor brought America into the war, Roosevelt used his emergency powers to restore the Council of National Defense, resuscitate the Office of Emergency Management, and seize several factories to ensure the continued production of munitions that might be used in a coming war. He secretly negotiated a deal with Canada that permitted the U.S. to patrol the Canadian coastline, freeing up Canadian ships to join the European war on the side of Britain, and made similar secret deals with other allies. The Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 all but disowned America's official neutrality even before it formally entered the war. Generally speaking, Congress ceded powers to Roosevelt throughout the war, often after the president, in impassioned public addresses, threatened to seize the power even without congressional authorization. Once the war 47 [1946] S.C.R. 248 (Feb. 20, 1946 and to trigger special police powers of the federal government. Under the authority of the Emergency Detention Act, 58 the attorney general was given the power to seize anyone he had ''a reasonable ground to believe'' was engaged in espionage or sabotage, and authorization was given for detention centers to be set up around the country to house them. 59 But while Truman was quite reluctant to use some of the powers delegated to him (for example, he never embarked on the mass detentions for which Congress had provided the budget and J. Edgar Hoover's FBI had compiled the list of suspects), he was also willing to use supposedly inherent presidential powers to act to defend America's security with respect to the war effort. When he eventually seized the steel mills during a labor dispute to keep war production going, the Supreme Court had other ideas about the extent of his inherent powers.
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But the emergency powers that successive presidents exercised during the Cold War generally went unchallenged, either by the Court or by Congress.
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In Canada, the overt emergency powers of the War Measures Act faded after World War II in favor of the vaguer powers of the more usual foreignthreat-based emergency that was the Cold War. The opening salvo of the Cold War in Canada was the secretly authorized arrest in 1946 of more than a dozen people accused of spying on behalf of the Soviet Union.
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The spying charges were clearly part of the newly gathering Cold War rather than of World War II. But the order that authorized the arrests was made under the War Measures Act, still in effect by extension after World War II had ended. As it turned out, then, the arrests of accused Soviet spies were authorized under an order given pursuant to a declaration of emergency powers for the war years-when the Soviet Union had been Canada's ally. A commission of inquiry provided the evidence against the spies; they were 57 64 Stat. 987 (1950). charged primarily under the Official Secrets Act. Not all those accused were found guilty; in fact, the ordinary Canadian courts that heard the cases were quite skeptical of the government's claims. 63 Though the government proceeded under the banner of emergency powers, the courts refused to defer. The War Measures Act was never invoked to deal with the Cold War in Canada, but executive powers to handle the always implicit Soviet threat were increased all the same. Though much quieter, when compared with the flamboyant American anticommunist hunts, Canada had its own domestic McCarthyism, which affected cultural institutions, bent immigration procedures, and resulted in a large number of Canadians being caught up in the new national security state. In both Canada and the U.S., the Cold War normalized the use of emergency powers to cope with the ever-present (or so they thought) communist threat.
Turning points: Emergency's excesses
By the 1970s, both Canada and the U.S. were using emergency powers so routinely that they had become part of ordinary governance. Foreign threats were met with domestic surveillance of dissenters; domestic protests were treated as foreign threats. The political, social, and cultural upheaval that came to be called the Sixties was addressed in both countries with extensive emergency powers.
The growth of the domestic national security apparatus during the Cold War in the United States generally was justified under the banner of state necessity. Large-scale surveillance of Americans suspected of subversion or sympathy with the enemy was conducted, and huge collections of dossiers on individual Americans and groups were amassed. When the Church Committee, constituted by the Senate to investigate such matters, finally inquired into the extent of domestic surveillance in the mid-1970s, it found that hundreds of thousands of individuals were the subject of intelligence agencies' files. Over 25,000 individuals had been put on lists to be rounded up in the event of a national emergency.
carried out in the United States. Shortly after this discovery, the CounterSubversion Branch of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) was closed. 66 The revelations of a massive surveillance operation in the U.S. caused Congress to adopt a number of measures designed to rein in the use of emergency powers. The Privacy Act of 1974 was intended to protect individuals from secret government data collection; the Freedom of Information Act gave individuals access to their records and to information about the government itself; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 required that warrants be obtained for foreign intelligence gathering operations conducted inside the United States. The Central Intelligence Agency was returned to its original mandate as it was banned from conducting domestic surveillance and investigations. And, crucially, a special committee of the United States Senate spearheaded an investigation into the use and abuse of emergency powers. Its findings-that by the mid-1970s more than 470 statutes delegated ''significant'' emergency powers to the president 67 The Parliament voted to invoke the War Measures Act on October 16, supporting measures that included outlawing the FLQ and criminalizing membership in the group, authorizing arrests and searches without warrants, permitting detention of suspected persons for up to twenty-one days without charges, and denying bail to anyone so detained. The police searched 3,000 separate properties without warrants and arrested 468 people without warrants, 435 of whom were eventually released without charge. In the end, ordinary policing without benefit of emergency shortcuts uprooted the cell that had murdered Laporte. And the kidnappers holding Cross were given safe passage to Cuba in exchange for his safe release. The army withdrew from Québec on January 4, 1971, and the War Measures Act provisions were allowed to expire on April 30. When the crisis was over, a number of critics argued that the whole matter could have been settled, as indeed it was in the end, as a matter of conventional policing without the use of emergency orders. 71 At least in part in reaction to the October Crisis, there were calls to change the constitutional framework altogether. With the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, an event of momentous constitutional significance in Canada, Canada's Constitution was fully patriated and featured human rights at its core. Given the extraordinary powers authorized under the War Measures Act, powers that would be hard to reconcile with the Charter, it should not be surprising that Canada repealed the War Measures Act in 1985, replacing it with a more measured and balanced Emergencies Act. 72 In fact, excesses in the use of the War Measures Act throughout its history were cited repeatedly in debate over the adoption of the Charter as a leading reason why the Charter was necessary. Under the new Emergencies Act, various sorts of national emergency are defined for the first time (rather than being left to the vagaries of the governor's determination) and, while the Governor-in-Council is given the power to proclaim an emergency, the Parliament has the power to revoke such a declaration. Parliament is given the power to ''supervise'' the emergency as well. Governmental powers under an emergency are more clearly delineated; consultation with provincial leaders is required where an emergency touches their territory. Perhaps most crucially, the Emergencies Act's preamble references the Canadian Charter, which itself has no provisions for derogation from rights in a time of emergency. The Emergencies Act has never in its nearly two decades of existence been invoked.
With these changes in place by the mid-1980s, Canada and the U.S. thus had different sorts of legal frameworks with which to regulate emergencies for the first time in their parallel histories. Canada brought the exercise of emergency powers under constitutional control, while the U.S. left the regulation of emergencies to piecemeal statutory reform without regularizing its constitutional status.
The challenge of terrorism after 9/11
After 9/11, the U.S. reacted with a far greater use of emergency powers than has Canada. This might, at first, be attributed to the fact that the U.S. was the country attacked. But both countries had strong reactions that were channeled in different ways. This, I will argue, shows that the differing reform paths of the 1970s and 1980s have produced real divergence now in North American emergencies.
When the hijacked planes crashed into their tragic targets on 9/11, there was what seemed like a long pause (in fact, only three days) before President George W. Bush declared a national emergency in the United States. 74 But his formal declaration was very limited in scope. He acted under statutory authority and indicated an intent to invoke only a limited number of his potential emergency powers. Outsized emergency powers were to come later; some under authority of legislation, but most by assertion of extraordinary executive license. The best known element of the post-9/11 response in the United States was the USA PATRIOT Act, adopted by the Congress in October 2001. 75 to immigration law and strategies of border protection. 78 Some provisions of the PATRIOT Act consolidated a series of defendant-unfriendly decisions that had already been issued by the federal courts in nonterrorism matters.
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Though the PATRIOT Act was raced through the Congress in record time, a number of softening changes were made to improve the accountability of the executive branch with regard to the new powers, and the worst of the new provisions were attached to a sunset clause. 80 As I write, the extension of the PATRIOT Act, once thought to be automatic, has been stalled over new revelations of a massive program of domestic spying carried out by executive order since 9/11.
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There are many elements of the PATRIOT Act that are controversial. For example, the highly visible Section 215 allows the government to seize ''any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents and other items)'' that might be useful in a terrorism investigation, even if the object or record itself does not belong or pertain directly to a terrorism suspect.
82 Such a seizure requires getting a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. But it is probably far easier for the government to acquire such records with a ''national security letter,'' a type of administrative subpoena that does not require the approval of a judge. 83 The range of documents that may be accessed with a national security letter was broadened in a little-noticed provision of the PATRIOT Act 84 that permitted the government to access telephone, financial, and consumer records. The scope of national security letters was further increased by a stealth amendment tucked away in an intelligence services financing bill in fall 2003. 85 The sweeping quality of national security letters-issued with such secrecy that their recipients are barred from talking to anyone about even the fact that they have received one-came in for judicial criticism when a federal district judge in the Southern District of New York held that the gag rule attached to national security letters violated the Fourth Amendment as it effectively barred the recipient from ever seeking judicial review of such a request.
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The PATRIOT Act also amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 87 to make it easier for the government to use the streamlined warrant process available under this law to put under electronic surveillance or to conduct searches of the premises of anyone suspected in an international terrorism investigation. 88 Now, it is FISA warrants, rather than the more usual ''Title III'' warrants 89 routinely used in criminal investigations, that are deployed almost exclusively in the war on terrorism. But FISA warrants, unlike Title III warrants, do not meet the requirement of the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment that ''no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.''
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The PATRIOT Act, while getting the lion's share of popular attention, was not the source of the most extreme examples of emergency powers after 9/11, however. Without benefit of specific legislation, the executive branch claimed the powers to detain within the U.S. anyone suspected of being a terroristincluding American citizens, permanent resident aliens, and visa-holding visitors-on a variety of extreme interpretations of previously granted powers. Some detainees were held as material witnesses in grand jury proceedings; 91 others were held for months on minor visa violations before being the different legal justifications, so that a series of limited if differing detentions were strung together to hold a particular suspect for a very long time. 93 Moreover, detainees were often rotated in their physical location as well, making access by counsel or families practically impossible even while officials were claiming that detainees had access to both. 94 Though it took awhile to determine it, the Department of Justice has documented that a number of those early detainees were beaten and abused in prisons around New York City.
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Later, the government claimed the authority to hold even American citizens indefinitely and without charges as ''enemy combatants.'' 96 The government has also aggressively used a pre-9/11 statute that allows the prosecution of terrorism suspects for contributing ''material support'' 97 to a terrorist organization, even though federal courts have twice declared elements of the concept of ''material support'' unconstitutional because they are too vague to be the basis for a criminal prosecution.
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Most of the powers that the U.S. president has asserted in domestic affairs to cope with the threat of terrorism have not been enacted by statute since 9/11 but have resulted, instead, from new uses of old laws and edgy, aggressive interpretations of ''plenary'' constitutional executive powers. Novel constitutional and statutory interpretation, rather than new lawmaking, has been the source of much of the legal framework used by the Bush Administration in the post-9/11 struggle against terrorism.
Since 9/11, the Bush Administration has asserted extraordinary constitutional powers by claiming that the country is at war and then invoking an allpowerful commander-in-chief clause of the U.S. Constitution for justification of these powers. This has become most evident in the remarkable series of memos leaked from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the office within the Justice Department that provides legal advice for the executive branch. OLC lawyers advised the president that it was unconstitutional for Congress to have passed the War Crimes Act 99 and the Torture Act, 100 criminalizing in American federal law grave breaches of the Geneva convention or torture committed abroad when done by U.S. nationals, because the president has complete control over the conduct of war. 101 Not only would Congress be unable to intervene in the conduct of the war, according to the arguments of the administration's lawyers, but the courts also would be limited in their ability to find any government official guilty of having committed war-onterrorism-related criminal offenses. The OLC ''torture'' memo went on to indicate that a U.S. national who engaged in torture abroad and was arrested for it upon his return to the U.S. could avail himself of a commander-in-chief defense to such a charge:
[T]he defendant could claim that he was fulfilling the Executive Branch's authority to protect the federal government, and the nation, from attack. The September 11 attacks have already triggered that authority. . . . If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate [the Torture Act], he would be doing so in order to prevent a further attack on the United States by the al Qaeda network. In that case, we believe that he could argue that his actions were justified by the executive branch's constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack.
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Any attempt by Congress to constrain the president, then, could be avoided either by a constitutional finding that Congress could not legislate in the antiterrorism campaign or by an executive-branch-based defense to any concrete criminal charge. In other words, the official legal view of the executive branch is that the president has sole and absolute power to do whatever is necessary to protect the country. American courts, with only a few exceptions, have largely approved the Bush administration's legal strategy. For example, the use of material witness warrants as a sort of preventive detention was eventually upheld. Other rumored cases under the new terrorism definition of the ATA were dropped quietly without charges or with more information forthcoming.
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In short, the powers authorized under the new law were rarely, if ever, used. Two other controversial institutions created by the Bill C-36 (the investigative hearing 116 and ''preventive arrests'' 117 ) have also been rarely, if ever, been used. In the investigative hearing, a police officer (upon approval of the attorney general) may ask a judge to call a person in for questioning and the person thus called may not refuse to answer questions or refuse to produce ''any thing in their possession or control'' on grounds of self-incrimination. The information obtained through investigative hearings may not be used against the person in a criminal proceeding, though it may be used for national security investigations.
In the first and only use of the procedure, a case was brought on reference of the hearing judge before the Supreme Court of Canada. 118 The Court upheld the investigative hearing provision of the ATA against a general Charter challenge but required that the witness have access to counsel in all appearances. The Court also ruled that the questions asked of the witness had to be narrowly relevant to a terrorism investigation. The investigative hearings provision of the ATA was deemed not to be in violation of section 7 of the Charter because both absolute use and derivative use immunity were provided to the witness. According to the Court, the rule against testimonial compulsion was, as a result, not infringed. This ruling, however, generated three dissenters. In the companion case brought by media organizations seeking access to the investigative hearings, 119 the Court tilted in favor of the media claims for access to the proceedings. These two decisions, taken together, are far from sweeping rejections of one of the most controversial provisions of the ATA. Instead, the judges opted to uphold the statute and provide a more rights-friendly interpretation than the government might have been inclined to provide. But the plurality opinion explicitly noted that legal constraints were still in force in the crisis: ''Although terrorism necessarily changes the context within which the rule of law must operate, it does not call for the abdication of law. '' 120 As it turns out, these cases appear to spring from the only time that the investigative hearing procedure has been used since it went into effect. The ATA required the Department of Justice of Canada to report on the number of investigative hearings conducted each year, and in the first three years of the statute's operation, only this one case was reported.
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The other controversial new procedure under the ATA, the preventive arrest, permits a ''peace officer'' to arrest a person without a warrant if ''the peace officer reasonably suspects that the detention of the person in custody is necessary in order to prevent a terrorist attack.'' 122 A person so arrested must be brought before a judge, typically within twenty-four hours, and can be held no more than seventy-two hours without formal charge. To permit continued detention beyond the twenty-four hours, the judge both must be convinced that the officer's suspicions were reasonable and must find a substantial risk either that the suspect would flee or that the suspect would cause harm to the public. While this provision generated a great deal of criticism upon passage, government reports indicate that there have been no arrests without warrant in the first three years after the law was passed. 123 Both investigative hearings and preventive arrests are subject to a five-year sunset clause in the ATA, 124 which means that the law may well expire without these provisions ever being used for 9/11-related terrorism. The ATA sparked a far-reaching discussion both within the Parliament and among members of the broader society about what Canada could and should be willing to do to fight terrorism. 125 bill, in its final version, tightens up protection of dangerous materials and vulnerable sites, rather than going after potentially dangerous persons. As a result, it poses far fewer challenges to civil liberties. As in the U.S., however, the formal laws passed since 9/11 do not tell the whole story of what is being done to combat terrorism. As Kent Roach has shown, Canadian immigration law, already short on procedural guarantees for those unlucky enough to be caught within its purview, has been used instead of the criminal law, to detain and eventually deport noncitizens who are suspected of terrorism-related activity. 128 The Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) 129 has been used more often than the ATA against terrorism suspects since 9/11 ''because it allows procedural shortcuts and a degree of secrecy that would not be tolerated under even an expanded criminal law. '' 130 In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada recently agreed to review the practice of issuing ''security certificates'' that allow aliens to be detained indefinitely without charges pending deportation, 131 a practice in increased use since 9/11. The Supreme Court of Canada has already reviewed decisions made under IRPA, particularly in a post-9/11 case that arose on pre-9/11 facts. Suresh v. Canada 132 concerned a convention refugee from Sri Lanka whose involvement with the Tamil Tigers prompted the Canadian government to declare him a danger to the security of Canada and to undertake to deport him. Suresh, the immigrant, argued that he would be subjected to torture if sent back to his home country. The minister of citizenship and immigration made an adverse decision in his case, from which he appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, claiming Charter violations under section 7 (protecting life, liberty, and security against deprivation unless in accord with the principles of fundamental justice) and section 2 (freedom of thought and association which the judgment against Suresh was made but indicated that the minister had to conduct the deportation hearing differently and had to consider a wider range of legal norms and factual evidence in her judgment. Deporting a person to torture, the Court ruled, would violate both Canadian law and international norms. But the threat of torture had to be ''serious'' and ''based on evidence,'' which, the Court further ruled, Suresh had a right to provide. The other notable security measures taken in Canada since 9/11 are controversial precisely because they appear to back up U.S. measures taken to combat terrorism. So, for example, criticism of the United States has subjected outspoken protesters to police investigation. 133 Criticism of Canada's complicity with U.S. policy in Guantánamo, seen as Canada has visibly handed captives over to the U.S., 134 has combined with allegations of Canadian participation in (or at least a failure to object to) the deportation of one of its own nationals to Syria where he was tortured. 135 In both cases, serious questions have been raised in Canada about whether Canada has been too willing to follow the United States into international activities that violate human rights. Meanwhile, Canada has been pressured by the U.S.-with the criticism that Canada has not done enough to stop terrorism-into increasing border security, tightening its own immigration policies, and generally cracking down on terrorism. 136 In December 2003, Canada created a new Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, complete with its own minister, to coordinate security and emergency policy in a move reminiscent of the drive to create the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In spring 2004, Canada produced a white paper outlining its plans for a new National Security Policy, 137 dealing not only with the threat of international terrorism but also with health emergencies like SARs, natural disasters, and other disruptive events. The proposal outlined a new institutional infrastructure for Canadian security policy, one that proposed better coordination of counterterrorism efforts. But, significantly, the plan also included increased democratic accountability of counterterrorism efforts by including a Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to involve Canada's affected minorities as well as a new panel of experts outside government and a new oversight committee of the Parliament. The general thrust of the plan was to bring more parties into the overall planning of security policy, to ensure greater coordination of effort, and to put out in the open the structures and rules for handling threats from terrorism, among other potential dangers. While the U.S. and Canada both reacted with new laws and new policies to the heightened threat of terrorist attacks after 9/11, the U.S.'s policies have been far more draconian, far less likely to be based on statutory enactment, more likely to concentrate powers in the executive branch, and, in general, far more aggressive than Canada's. In Canada, post-9/11 legislation was ''Charter proofed'' before enactment, which meant that all legislation was vetted in the Department of Justice to ensure it complied with the government's understanding of what the new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required. While Charter proofing has its critics, 138 it is surely far better for a government to attempt to comply with the Constitution than either to ignore it or to claim that executive powers swallow the rest in a time of crisis.
Conclusions
Despite the many similarities between the U.S. and Canada, the history of emergency powers shows that the previously common ground has eroded. In times of crisis, the U.S. government has shown itself willing and able to take extraordinary measures to meet the threat. Canada showed the same pattern throughout most of its history, but post-Charter actions have diverged from this path. The U.S. and Canada had previously evinced similar reactions in international crises before 9/11, but they are taking different paths now. While it is always impossible to know just what causes differences between two cases confronted with a single common episode, I believe that the Canadian constitutional revolution of the 1980s has produced a very different sensibility about the rule of law, the possibility of exception from it, and the extent to which all governmental power in Canada is to be held accountable to constitutional principles. The U.S. has had no comparable constitutional revolution around its uses of emergency powers. Instead, the U.S. approach is to control excesses in emergency powers through statute, largely after the fact, which has invited the executive to claim the superior ground of the president's article II powers, as, in fact, presidents from Lincoln to Roosevelt to Nixon have done before the present post-9/11 moment. And, as President Bush is doing now.
But some have argued that the U.S., in fact, has improved at responding to crises-that the emergency measures taken after 9/11 are less extreme than those taken in response to earlier threats. One such argument can be found in Geoffrey Stone's recent book Perilous Times.
139 Stone traces assaults on dissent and free speech through U.S. history and claims that the general trajectory of U.S. reaction has been toward increasing tolerance of dissent and decreasing restrictions of speech in crises, including after 9/11. Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein have argued much the same with respect to military tribunals
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-that the public criticism of the Bush military tribunals, when they are compared with those established during World War II by President Roosevelt, shows an increased national sensitivity to deviations from normal forms of justice. If Stone and Goldsmith and Sunstein are right, then that would point to an improvement in America's constitutional sensibility, something that would be visible after 9/11. If that were the case, then perhaps the U.S. would be closer to Canada than my review would make it appear.
A closer review of these arguments, however, shows that they are not fundamentally inconsistent with mine. It may well be that the U.S. government no longer punishes critical speech and principled dissent as it used to; my arguments about 9/11 concern the other strategies that the government is using, such as bypassing Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, avoiding trying people suspected of terrorism in ordinary courts, and finding ways to hold them indefinitely without legal process. Restrictions on speech and dissent may have improved in crises, but that does not mean that other restrictions have not remained the same or possibly become worse. Similarly, Goldsmith and Sunstein argue on the facts of reaction exactly as I do-that American strategies for coping with crises have not changed. Both Roosevelt and Bush resorted to military tribunals. It is only the changed reactions of the public that Goldsmith and Sunstein highlight as a difference between the World War II measures and those of today. But the current criticisms have not stopped the assertion of plenary executive power.
Similarly, on the Canadian side, official reactions to 9/11 have been greeted with a sense that Canadian values have been sacrificed to fight the war on terrorism. Kent Roach, writing shortly after 9/11 and the passage of the ATA, observed, ''My fear is that September 11 is driving us towards Americanized criminal justice and foreign policies that depart from Canadian 
